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Abstract
This paper develops a model of choice between marriage and cohabitation
to study the eect of divorce costs on marriage decision. The paired agents are
heterogeneous, the utility is non-transferable, and break up and divorce deci-
sions are modeled explicitly as unilateral, that is, it takes the decision of only
one partner to terminate a relationship. This framework is empirically rele-
vant, since unilateral divorce is legal in many countries, and multiple empirical
studies of the eect of changes in divorce laws on divorce rates demonstrate
that Coase theorem does not hold (partners cannot bargain eciently). The
model seeks to reconcile the conicting empirical evidence on the relationship
between marriage rates and divorce costs.
Keywords: family economics, marriage, cohabitation, divorce, externalities
JEL classication: D62, D91, J12
1 Introduction
Marriage rates vary signicantly across countries. For instance, in 2009 Slovenia had
the lowest marriage rate among the OECD countries, 3:17 versus 7:31 for the US.1
Comparisons with countries outside of the OECD reveal even larger dierences in
marriage rates around the world. Marriage rates in the developed countries have also
declined over time, and most of the debate around the institution of marriage has
focused on these trends. Since 1970, the average marriage rate for the twenty seven
OECD countries has fallen by almost 40%.2
Economists tend to seek the explanation for social phenomena from the point of
the cost / benet analysis. The data indicate that there are vast dierences among
countries in social, economic, and legal relative costs and benets of marriage, and
that the relative benets of marriage must have declined over the past few decades.
This paper focuses on the eect of divorce costs on marriage decisions and the
resulting relationship between divorce costs and marriage rates. Since cohabitation
is often a precursor or even a substitute for legal marriage, agents in the model
can choose to cohabit or marry legally. 3 Empirical evidence indicates that higher
divorce costs can result in either higher or lower marriage rates and the model seeks
to reconcile this evidence.
Rasul [9] presents evidence that the adoption of unilateral divorce in the US has
contributed to the decline in marriage rates. Matouschek and Rasul [7] demonstrate
that propensity to divorce is lower for couples married after the introduction of uni-
lateral divorce laws in the US. Their paper and the work of Rasul [10] also develop
theoretical models of marriage that explain these ndings: marriage contract acts
as a commitment device and lower exiting costs undermine its ability to serve this
1Marriage rate is dened as the number of marriages performed in a given year divided by total
population and multiplied by 1000.
2Source: OECD [8]. The exact numbers vary across countries, but the overall trends remain
roughly similar.
3Stevensen and Wolfers [11] discuss recent trends in cohabitation and marriage.
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purpose.
Adoption of unilateral divorce laws can be interpreted as a reduction in costs of
obtaining divorce. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between marriage rates across
countries with unilateral divorce laws and a dierent measure of divorce costs: the
length of the mandatory separation period before the divorce is legalized. 4 Countries
with longer separation requirements are interpreted to have higher divorce costs.
Figure 1 shows that marriage rates are higher in countries with lower divorce costs.
Figure 1: Marriage rates and no-consent divorce laws
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4The sample includes countries with unilateral divorce legislation for which the author was able
to obtain information on legal grounds for divorce. There are 36 countries in the sample: Argentina
(AR), Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belarus (BY), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Croa-
tia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany
(DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania
(LT), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Por-
tugal (PT), Russian Federation (RU), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH),
Ukraine (UA), United Kingdom (UK), Uruguay (UY), Venezuela (VE). Note that the US is not on
the sample since the divorce law diers by state.
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The model in this paper seeks to reconcile this evidence. It combines two incen-
tives to marry: 1) exogenous benets to marriage, social, nancial, or legal, and 2)
commitment value of marriage, which is an endogenous outcome of higher separation
costs associated with divorce. Single agents are matched in pairs and are free to enter
either type of relationship contract or to remain single. The decisions are based on the
observed initial match quality and expectations of the future match qualities, and the
utility is non-transferable. For every cohabiting or married agent future realizations
of the additional match quality shock are random. The agents are heterogeneous:
paired agents may receive dierent realizations of this match quality signal. Paired
agents observe their individual realization of the match quality shock, and each agent
makes his or her decision on whether to stay in the current relationship or terminate
it. The match survives only if both partners choose to preserve it.
The assumption of non-transferable relationship utility is very important. Since
Becker, Landes and Michael [1], most of the theoretical literature on marriage and
divorce typically assumes that the Coase theorem applies to marital bargaining, so
spouses can always reach divorce agreements by the redistribution of welfare. If
this assumption is valid, changes in consent versus no-consent divorce laws should
have no eect on incidences of divorce and marriage. Empirical studies, however,
demonstrate that the change to no-fault unilateral divorce laws has caused a small,
but statistically signicant increase in the divorce rates in the US and Europe. 5
More recent models of marriage assume that Coasian bargaining is not possible in
marriage: for example, Fella et al [3], Rasul [10], and Guha [6]. This paper follows in
their footsteps, demonstrating that the inability of partners to eciently compensate
each other when separation is desirable by only one of them plays a crucial role in
determining the relationship between divorce costs and the decision to marry.
The non-transferability of utility only matters when the agents are heterogeneous.
Otherwise, they make the same decisions and no transfers between partners are ef-
5See Friedberg [4] and Wolfers [12] for the US and Gonzalez and Viitanen [5] for Europe.
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cient. To illustrate the eect of the heterogeneity assumption on the model's pre-
dictions when the utility is non-transferable this paper considers three cases: 1) the
paired agents are homogeneous, that is, they receive the same future realizations of
the match quality shock; 2) the agents are heterogeneous and their utility depends
only on their own realization of the relationship quality signal, but not their partner's;
3) the agents are heterogeneous and the utility of each partner depends not only on
his/her realized match quality, but also on that of the other partner. The rst case
introduces the framework and shows that when the agents are homogeneous or, al-
ternatively, the utility is perfectly transferable, the model cannot generate a positive
relationship between divorce costs and marriage rates. The second case contains the
main result of the paper, and the third case is a robustness check.
The analysis in the paper (cases two and three) demonstrates that when the
agents are heterogeneous and the utility is non-transferable, higher costs of divorce
may increase the value of marriage and make it preferred to cohabitation even in
the absence of additional benets to marriage. The intuition is as follows. Any
relationship survives if and only if both partners chose to maintain it. If one person
enjoys the relationship and prefers to stay in it, she would only be able to do so if her
partner also prefers not to terminate it. If he is no longer happy in the relationship
and chooses to end it, his decision imposes a negative externality on her. Higher
costs of terminating legal marriage may induce her partner to choose to preserve
the relationship, eliminating the negative externality. Thus, commitment is valuable
and divorce costs make marriage a more committed relationship form. If marriage
does not carry any additional benets relative to cohabitation, the model generates
a positive relationship between divorce costs and marriage rates, consistent with the
evidence on the decline in marriage rates after the adoption of unilateral divorce laws
from Rasul [9]. What about the negative relationship between marriage rates and the
diculty of obtaining divorce in Figure 1?
If marriage provides additional utility relative to cohabitation, however small, the
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predicted relationship between the costs of divorce and marriage rates becomes U-
shaped: the marriage rate declines for lower values of divorce costs and increases for
the costs of divorce above some threshold value. When the divorce costs are relatively
low, the exogenous marriage benet serves as the main incentive for marriage, and
couples that marry for this incentive are discouraged with higher divorce costs. Once
the divorce costs are high relative to the marriage benet, the commitment eect
dominates the marriage benet incentive, and the additional couples choose marriage
for the lower likelihood of separation. Thus, the model is capable of reconciling
empirical evidence when both incentives to marry are present.
Rasul [10] was the rst to demonstrate the commitment value of greater diculty
of obtaining divorce in the mutual consent divorce regime with non-transferable utility
and heterogeneous agents. He studies how the move from mutual consent divorce
to unilateral divorce aects the marriage market outcomes with a model of choice
between marriage and singlehood. The model can explain the observed decline in
marriage rates after the adoption of unilateral divorce laws.
Theoretical models of greater commitment in marriage relative to cohabitation
have been developed by Wydick [13] and Matouschek and Rasul [7]. They have
homogeneous agents and use a repeated prisoner's dilemma game setting to show that
marriage can foster cooperation better than cohabitation due to its higher termination
costs. The implication is that partners in marriage are more likely to act cooperatively
towards each other and behave themselves than the cohabiters, so marriage generates
endogenous benets relative to cohabitation.
Brien, Lillard, and Stern [2] and Matouschek and Rasul [7] have models of choice
between cohabitation and marriage with marriage providing an exogenous benet to
both spouses. These models predict a negative relationship between divorce costs and
marriage rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The
solution of the model with homogeneous agents and the results are given in Section
5
3. Section 4 solves the model with heterogeneous agents and independent utilities
and presents the main intuition and the results of the paper. Section 5 explores the
implications of assuming that paired agents have interdependent utilities. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model Setup
This section presents the basic framework for analyzing the relationship between
divorce costs, marriage benets, and marriage market outcomes.
Men and women in the model are symmetric.
The model has two periods. In the beginning of period one individuals are matched
in pairs and draw the same couple specic match quality shock q from uniform distri-
bution on [qL; qH ], where qL < 0 < qH . The match quality determines the relationship
utility each agent receives in period one if he / she were to enter a household sharing
relationship with the current match partner. Assume that the relationship utility in
period one is equal to the realization of match quality q. The utility from remaining
single is normalized to zero.
Upon observing q, each agent decides whether to remain single or enter into cohab-
itation or marriage with the current match partner. Since the initial match quality
is the same for both match partners, they make identical decisions.
Single agents remain single in period two and receive the total utility of zero.
Cohabiting and married agents receive an additional individual relationship quality
shock x from the same distribution. Upon observing the quality shocks, each agent
unilaterally decides whether to preserve the relationship or to exit it. If the relation-
ship is preserved, each agent in a couple receives relationship utility of r (q; x; x ) in
period two, where x is the realization of the agent's own additional match quality
shock and x is that of his/her partner. If the agents separate, each receives the
utility of zero in period two. The relationship survives only if both agents make the
6
decision to maintain it.
For what values of q do single agents decide in period one to remain single, cohabit,
or marry? Denote the expected value of remaining single when the observed initial
match quality is q by S (q), the expected value of cohabiting by R (q), and that of
getting married by W (q). There is no discounting between periods.
The expected value of cohabitation and marriage depend on the decisions of agents
in period two. Each agent observes the additional shocks to match quality in period
two and compares the value from staying together to that of splitting. Assume that
for cohabiting agents the cost of breaking up is zero, and that for married agents the
cost of obtaining divorce is d > 0. Then, each cohabiting agent will choose to stay
in the relationship as long as the resulting relationship utility in period two exceeds
zero, and each married agent will decide to stay married if the total utility from being
married exceeds  d.
Assume also that married agents may receive an additional exogenous utility bonus
M  0 in every period of their marriage.
Next we explore three cases:
1. The agents are homogeneous: both partners receive the same additional match
quality shock x. Thus, they make identical decisions and break-up or divorce
occurs only if benecial to both. This case is studied in Section 3.
2. The agents are heterogeneous: the additional match quality shocks are inde-
pendent draws from the same distribution. Also, for each agent in a couple the
utility in period two depends only on the realization of own additional match
quality shock x, @r(q;x;x )
@x
= 0. Thus, match partners can make dierent de-
cisions. The relationship is preserved only if both prefer not to terminate it.
If one agent decides to end the relationship while the other would prefer to
maintain it, this decision imposes a negative externality on the pro-relationship
partner. For simplicity, assume that the relationship utility is period two is
r (q; x; x ) = q   x. This case is explored in Section 4.
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3. The agents are heterogeneous with independent realizations of the additional
relationship quality shock in period two and @r(q;x;x )
@x
6= 0. That is, the relation-
ship utilities are interdependent. Specically, assume u = x + (1  )x and
v = x +(1  )x, where 0:5 <  < 1. Then, in period two if the couple stays
intact the relationship utility of the rst agent is r (q; x; x ) = q   u, and that
of the second agent is r (q; x ; x) = q   v. Section 5 analyzes this case.
In order to solve the model for each of the three cases it remains to specify the
distribution for the additional match quality shock x. Assume that it is distributed
exponentially with mean 1=. The cumulative distribution function is
Fx (x) =
8<: 1  e x; x  00; x < 0 : (1)
3 Homogeneous agents
Here we assume that the paired agents are homogeneous, that is, the realized value of
the additional relationship quality shock is the same for both agents in a cohabiting
or married union, x = x . The relationship utility for paired agents in period two if
the agents stay together is r (q; x; x) = q   x.
The purpose of the analysis in this section is to demonstrate that in the absence
of heterogeneity and when the utility is non-transferable, higher divorce costs cannot
increase the relative value of marriage. That is, for any positive value of the marriage
benet, higher divorce costs result in lower marriage rates.
We begin by formulating the problem of cohabiting agent, and then proceed to
that of married agent.
In period two a cohabiting agent would prefer to stay in the relationship if the
relationship utility r (q; x; x ) = q   x  0. Since both agents in a couple receive the
same realization of the match quality shock, the probability of them staying together
is Fx (q).
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The expected value of cohabiting with the initial relationship quality q is R (q) =
q +
R q
0
(q   x) dFx(x). With the exponential cumulative distribution function
R (q) =
8<: 2q   1 e
 q

; q  0
q; q < 0
: (2)
A married agent with the initial relationship quality q would choose to stay mar-
ried in period two if the total utility r (q; x; x ) + M = q + M   x   d. Thus,
the expected value of marriage is W (q) = (q +M) +
R q+M+d
0
(q +M   x) dFx(x) +
[1  Fx (q +M + d)] ( d) or
W (q) =
8<: 2 (q +M)  1 e
 (q+M+d)

; q   M   d
(q +M)  d; q <  M   d
: (3)
To solve the model we need to nd the values of q for which matched agents choose
marriage in period one for given d and M . Denote the lowest value of q above which
matched agents prefer to marry by q. Recall the model's assumptions of d > 0 and
M  0. Proposition below establishes the following results:
Proposition 1 Let q be the initial relationship quality such that
i) q solves W (q) = max f0; R (q)g, where W (q) and R (q) are given by equations (3)
and (2) respectively;
ii) For all q  q, W (q)  max f0; R (q)g.
Then,
(a) For M = 0, q does not exist. That is, with no additional exogenous benets
marriage is never preferred to cohabitation or singlehood;
(b) For any M > 0, q is increasing in d.
Proof.
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Consider two cases: 1) R (q)  0 or, equivalently, q  0 and 2)  M   d  q < 0.
Note that when q <  M   d marriage is never chosen, so q cannot belong to this
range of q values.
1) q  0
From W
 
q

= R
 
q

obtain q = 1


ln
 
1  e (M+d)  ln (2M).
This value is  0 when M , d, and  are such that 2M  1  e (M+d).
For part (a) of the proposition, note that the solution exists only if M > 0. The
solution also satises condition ii) of the proposition when M is strictly positive.
To obtain (b), dierentiate q with respect to d:
@q
@d
= e
 (M+d)
1 e (M+d) .
The derivative is positive for all strictly positive and nite values of M , d, and .
2) q 2 [ M   d; 0)
The cut-o value q solvesW (q) = 0, whereW (q) = 2 (q +M)  1 e (q+M+d)

(from
equation 3). Unfortunately, no closed-form solution can be obtained. Analysis of
the function W (q) yields the following:
i) W (q) is strictly convex;
ii) It has a unique minimum that is below zero;
iii) limq! 1W (q) = limq!1W (q) =1;
Thus, equation W (q) = 0 has two roots. Denote these roots by q0 and q00, with
q0 > q00. W (q)  0 for q 2 ( 1; q00] and q 2 [q0;1).
Since W ( M   d) =  2d < 0, q00 <  M   d < q0. Thus, the unique candidate
solution for q is q0. It is the solution if also q0 < 0, which is true for allM , d, and 
such that 2M > 1  e (M+d). For (a), note that this condition is never satised
when M = 0.
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To show (b), implicitly dierentiate equation W
 
q

= 0 with respect to d:
@q
@d
= e
 (q+M+d)
2 e (q+M+d) > 0 for any q 2 [ M   d; 0).
Marriage rate can be obtained as the fraction of matches with initial relationship
quality of at least q. If Fq denotes the cumulative distribution function for q, then
MR = 1  Fq
 
q

. The main result of this section follows straightforwardly:
Corollary 2 (Divorce Costs and Marriage Rates: the Case of Homogeneous Agents)
Under the assumptions of the model with homogeneous agents,
(a) If M = 0, marriage rate is also zero for any value of divorce cost d;
(b) For any M > 0, marriage rate is a decreasing function of d.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between marriage rates and divorce costs for
dierent values of the exogenous marriage benetM when  = 0:5 and q is uniformly
distributed on [qL; qH ], with qL =  5 and qH = 10.6
Figure 2 A) depicts the lowest value of q above which matched agents prefer to
marry (q) as a function of the divorce cost d for M = 0, M = 0:1, M = 0:5, M = 1,
M = 2. Figure 2 B) shows the respected marriage rates, that is, the fraction of agents
that choose marriage in period one.
Observe that without exogenous benets to marriage (M = 0), marriage is never
optimal. For any M > 0, agents with higher values of the initial match quality prefer
to marry, and more agents marry for higher values ofM . For any value ofM marriage
rates decline in the cost of divorce d.
Figure 3 A) shows the net divorce rate for each value of M as function of divorce
cost, where net divorce rate is a fraction of married agents that divorce in period two.
The divorce rates are lower with higher cost of divorce.
6Note that higher values of  reduce the likelihood of "bad" relationship utility shocks in period
two. The likelihood of staying together in period two is higher for both married and cohabiting
couples, so the divorce costs play a relatively smaller role in the couple's decision of what type of
union to form.
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Figure 2: Homogeneous agents: Cut-o values of q and
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Average relationship welfare is depicted in Figure 3 B). It is computed without
the exogenous benet M , since it is obvious that adding a positive constant to utility
increases it, and we are interested in comparing the welfare from the matches for
various levels of M and d. Observe that higher exogenous marriage benets reduce
relationship welfare, since matches of lower quality result in marriages. The average
welfare also declines with d, since the divorce costs are incurred with positive prob-
ability in any marriage. For any value of M , the welfare maximizing divorce cost is
zero.
4 Heterogeneous agents: Independent utilities
In this section the agents are heterogeneous: in period two each paired agent draws
an additional match quality shock from the same distribution, and the draws are
independent. The relationship utility of each agent in period two depends only on
the agent's own realization of the match quality shock x and is independent of the
12
Figure 3: Homogeneous agents: Divorce rates and Av-
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value received by his/her partner x , specically, r (q; x; x ) = q   x. Upon observing
own quality shock, each agent unilaterally decides whether to stay in the relationship
or to exit it. The relationship is preserved only if both partners decide to maintain
it. Thus, exiting decision by one agent may impose a negative externality on his/her
partner if the partner would prefer to stay in the relationship.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that when the utility is non-transferable
and the agents are heterogeneous, positive divorce costs may help eliminate the exter-
nality and increase the value of marriage. Thus, for some values of marriage benets
and divorce costs marriage rate can increase in the cost of divorce.
Paired agents in period two draw independent realizations of the additional re-
lationship quality shock x from the same distribution Fx (x) from (1). They remain
paired only if both partners prefer to stay together. Thus, the expected value of cohab-
iting with initial match quality shock q isR (q) = q+Fx (q)
R q
0
(q   x) dFx(x), and that
of being married is W (q) = (q +M) +Fx (q +M + d)
R q+M+d
0
(q +M   x) dFx(x)+
1  Fx (q +M + d)2

( d).
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With the exponential cumulative distribution function
R (q) =
8<: q +
 
1  e q hq   1 e q

i
; q  0
q; q < 0
: (4)
and
W (q) =
8<: q +M   d+
 
1  e (q+M+d) hq +M + d  1 e (q+M+d)

i
; q   M   d
q +M   d; q <  M   d
:
(5)
Solving the model involves nding the values of q such that matched agents choose
marriage in period one for given d and M .
Figure 4 shows the cut-o values of the initial relationship quality q above which
matched agents prefer to marry as a function of the divorce cost d for several values
of M when  = 0:5.
Figure 4: Heterogeneous agents with independent util-
ities: Cut-o values of q
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First, note that for M = 0, the cut-o value of q is lower for higher values of
divorce costs, that is, when the divorce cost is larger it induces marriage for lower
match quality couples. The analysis in the previous section with homogeneous agents
demonstrated that in the absence of additional exogenous benets, marriage is never
preferred to cohabitation. This is no longer the case when the agents are heteroge-
neous with independent additional relationship quality shocks: marriage is preferred
by matched agents with higher initial match quality and the fraction of couples choos-
ing marriage increases with higher divorce cost. This is the commitment eect of
divorce costs.
For high values of the marriage benet M (here it is for M > 1) the relationship
between the cut-o value of q and the cost of divorce is reversed. Agents with lower
initial match qualities choose marriage, and their main incentive is obtaining the
exogenous marriage benet. These couples are discouraged by higher divorce costs.
The commitment eect of higher divorce costs is dominated when the exogenous
marriage benet is suciently large.
For intermediate values of the marriage benet (here for M 2 (0; 1]) the relation-
ship between the cut-o values of q and the cost of divorce is bell-shaped. For small
divorce costs, couples with matches of lower quality marry to obtain the exogenous
benet M . Since they divorce with positive probability, higher divorce costs reduce
the relative value of marriage, resulting in higher cut-o values of q for marriage.
When d is suciently large, the commitment eect dominates. Higher divorce costs
help eliminate the break-up externality and induce marriage for lower match quality
couples.
The following proposition formally establishes these results:
Proposition 3 Let q be the initial relationship quality such that
i) q solves W (q) = max f0; R (q)g, where W (q) and R (q) are given by equations (5)
and (4) respectively;
ii) For all q  q, W (q)  max f0; R (q)g.
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Then,
(A) For M = 0, 1) q  0 and 2) q is decreasing in d;
(B) 9M > 0, such that for any M > M , q is increasing in d;
(C) For M 2 (0;M ], q can be increasing or decreasing in d.
Proof.
Let
D (t) =
 
1  e t t  1  e t


=

t  1


+
e t

 
2  t  e t (6)
for any real t  0.
Let  (q) = W (q) max f0; R (q)g. From (4), (5), and (6)
 (q) =
8>>><>>>:
(M   d) +D (q +M + d) D (q) ; q  0
(q +M   d) +D (q +M + d) ; q 2 [ M   d; 0]
(q +M   d) ; q   M   d
: (7)
Then, q is the value of initial relationship quality q such that 1) 
 
q

= 0 and 2)
for all q  q,  (q) > 0.
Note that for any q   M   d,  (q) < 0. Thus, in what follows, this case is not
considered.
Claim (A): For M = 0, 1) q  0 and 2) q is decreasing in d, that is, its derivative
with respect to d is negative: q
d
(d) < 0 .
For any real t  0, let
v0 (t) = e
 t  2  t  e t ; (8)
Then, from (6) and (8),
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D (t) =

t  1


+
1

v0 (t) (9)
The properties of function v0 (t) are explored in the Appendix. We use these
properties to prove parts 1) and 2) of Claim (A):
1) Show that q  0. Suppose not, i.e., q 2 [ d; 0). Then, from (9) and (7), (q) = 
2q   1


+ 1

v0 ( (q + d)) < 0 8q < 0. This is because v0 (t)  1 for any t  0
(See Appendix). Thus, q < 0 does not exist.
2) Consider q  0 and show that q
d
(d) < 0.
For M  0, q solves  (q) = (M   d) +D (q +M + d) D (q) = 0. Equivalently,
 (q) = 2M + 1

[v0 ( (q +M + d))  v0 (q)] = 0.
When M = 0,  (q) = 0 is equivalent to v0 ( (q + d)) = v0 (q).
From the properties of v0 (t) (See Figure 11 A) in the Appendix), conclude that
q 2   t0

; t1


and q
d
(d) < 0, where t0 solves v0 (t) = 0 and t1 solves v
0
0 (t) = 0.
Next we show claim (C) and use the result to establish claim (B).
Claim (C): For any xed value of M > 0, q
d
(d) can be positive, negative, or zero.
Let q (d) be the root of equation  (q; d) = 0 for any xed M  0. That is,

 
q (d) ; d

= 0. Fully dierentiate this equation with respect to d to nd the deriva-
tive q
d
(d):
q
d
(d) =  d
 
q (d) ; d

q
 
q (d) ; d
 ;
where q and d denote the derivatives of  (q) with respect to q and d, respect-
fully.
By dierentiating (7) for q   M   d, obtain
17
q =
8<: D0 (q +M + d) D0 (q) ; q  01 +D0 (q +M + d) ; q 2 [ M   d; 0]
and
d = D
0 (q +M + d)  1; q   M   d:
Dierentiate (6) to obtain D0 (t) = 1 + e t
 
t  3 + 2e t, 8t  0.
Let
v1 (t) = e
 t  t  3 + 2e t : (10)
Then,
D0 (t) = 1 + v1 (t) : (11)
Using (11) obtain
q =
8<: v1 ( (q +M + d))  v1 (q) ; q  02 + v1 ( (q +M + d)) ; q 2 [ M   d; 0] (12)
and
d = v1 ( (q +M + d)) ; q   M   d: (13)
The properties of function v1 (t) are explored in the Appendix.
To determine the signs of q and d, consider the two cases: 1) q 2 [ M   d; 0)
and 2) q  0:
1) q 2 [ M   d; 0)
q = 2 + v1
 

 
q +M + d

> 0 since v1 (t)   1 8t  0 (See Figure 11 B) in
the Appendix).
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d = v1
 

 
q +M + d

, thus,
d is
8<:  0; q 2
 M   d; t1

 M   d
 0; q 2  t1

 M   d; 0 ;
where t1 solves v1 (t) = 0.
2) q  0
First, show that q < t1

.
As previously established, 8q  0, q solves  (q) = 2M+ 1

[v0 ( (q +M + d))  v0 (q)] =
0. Equivalently,
2M = v0
 
q
  v0    q +M + d : (14)
Suppose q  t1

. For all t  t1, v0 (t) is an increasing function, so v0
 

 
q +M + d

>
v0
 
q
 8q  t1

.
Thus, equation 14 cannot hold and q < t1

.
Next, determine the signs of q and d for all q  0.
Analysis for d remains as before.
For q 2 0; t1


, q = v1
 

 
q +M + d
  v1  q > 0.
Combining the two cases, obtain
q
d
(d) is
8<:  0; q 2
 M   d; t1

 M   d
 0; q 2  t1

 M   d; t1

 :
Claim (B): 9M > 0, such that for any xed M > M , q
d
(d) > 0.
Let q (M) be the root of equation  (q;M) = 0 for any xed d > 0. As before, can
obtain the derivative of q (M) with respect to M by fully dierentiating this equation
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with respect to M :
q
M
(M) =  M
 
q (M) ;M

q
 
q (M) ;M
 ;
The derivative of  (q) with respect to M is
M = 1 +D
0 (q +M + d) = 2 + v1 ( (q +M + d)) > 0; q   M   d:
Since q > 0 8q 2
 M   d; t1


, conclude that q
M
(M) < 0.
 ( M   d) =  2d and  (q) is continuous and strictly increasing with respect
to M . As M gets larger, the root of  (q) = 0 shifts to the left, closer to ( M   d).
Thus, there exists M such that q (M) = t1

  M   d < 0 and for M > M ,
q 2  M   d; t1

 M   d and q
d
(d) > 0.
Marriage rate is the fraction of matches with initial relationship quality of at
least q. As before, let Fq denote the cumulative distribution function for q, then
MR = 1  Fq
 
q

. The following corollary establishes the main result of this section:
Corollary 4 (Divorce Costs and Marriage Rates: the Case of Heterogeneous Agents)
Under the assumptions of the model with heterogeneous agents,
(a) If M = 0, marriage rate is increasing in divorce cost d;
(b) 9M > 0, such that for any M > M , marriage rate is decreasing in d;
(c) For M 2 (0;M ], marriage rate can be decreasing or increasing in d.
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between marriage rate and divorce costs for
 = 0:5, qL =  5, and qH = 10.
This simple model suggest the following explanation of the empirical evidence.
Rasul [9] nds that marriage rates in the US decline after reduction in divorce costs.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous agents with independent util-
ities, continuous case: Marriage rate
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This evidence is consistent with the commitment model of marriage. Here the com-
mitment eect dominates when the exogenous benets to marriage are low relative
to the cost of divorce.
The relationship between marriage rates and the measure of diculty of obtaining
divorce across countries is, however, of the opposite sign. The exogenous benets part
of the marriage decision story appears to be more relevant.
Figure 6 A) shows the net divorce rate as a decreasing function of the divorce
cost d. Figure 6 B) depicts the average relationship welfare for dierent values of M .
As before, it is lower for higher values of M since matches of lower quality result in
marriage. The total welfare maximizing divorce cost depends on the value of M . For
small values of the exogenous marriage benet, M = 0 and M = 0:1, the welfare is
increasing in d, so the optimal divorce cost is equal to the highest value in the given
range, d = 10. Higher divorce costs help eliminate the negative break-up externality,
increasing the expected value of marriage and welfare. For higher values of M the
commitment eect of higher divorce costs is weaker, thus, the welfare-maximizing
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous agents with independent util-
ities, continuous case: Divorce rates and Av-
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divorce cost is small, just above zero.
We conclude that when the agents are heterogeneous, the relationship utility is
non-transferable, and the cost of divorce is high relative to the marriage benet,
decreasing the divorce costs can result in lower marriage rates. When the divorce
costs are relatively low, the marriage rate is a decreasing function of the divorce costs
for any positive marriage benet.
The assumption of heterogeneous agents with independent utilities, just like the
assumption of homogeneous agents, may be too strong. In the next section we re-
lax this assumption and solve the model for the case of heterogeneous agents with
interdependent utilities.
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5 Heterogeneous agents: Interdependent utilities
Consider any two agents comprising a cohabiting or married couple in period two.
Refer to these agents as agent 1 and agent 2. The additional match quality shock of
agent 1 in period two is x, and that of agent 2 is x . As before, both x and x are
drawn independently from the same exponential distribution with mean 1=.
Let u = x + (1  )x and v = x + (1  ) x, where 0:5 <  < 1. The
relationship utility of agent 1 in period two is r (q; x; x ) = q   u and that of agent 2
is r (q; x ; x) = q   v. Thus, the additional utility obtained by each agent in period
two is a linear combination of the agent's own match quality shock and that of his or
her partner, with a larger (in absolute value) weight assigned to the own relationship
quality shock.
Then, the expected value of cohabiting for agent 1 (similar for agent 2) with the
initial relationship quality q is
R (q) = q + Fu;v (q; q)
R q
0
(q   u) fu(u)
Fu(q)
du,
and that of being married is
W (q) = (q +M) + Fu;v (q +M + d; q +M + d)
R q+M+d
0
(q +M   u) fu(u)
Fu(q+M+d)
du +
[1  Fu;v (q +M + d; q +M + d)] ( d),
where Fu;v (u; v) is the joint cumulative distribution function of u and v, fu (u) is the
marginal density function of u, and Fu (u) is the marginal cumulative distribution
function of u.
To nd the joint distribution of u and v let the joint probability density function
of independent x and x be
fx;x (x; x ) =
8<:
 
e x
  
e x

; if x  0; x  0
0; otherwise
.
Dene A = f(x; x ) : fx;x (x; x )  0g and
B = f(u; v) : u = x+ (1  ) x ; v = x + (1  )x; 8 (x; x ) 2 Ag.
Then, the joint probability density function of u and v is
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fu;v (u; v) =
8<: 
2
2 1e
 (u+v); if (u; v) 2 B
0; otherwise
(15)
and the marginal probability density function and the cumulative distribution
function for u are, respectively,
fu (u) =
8<:

2 1

e 
u
   e  u1 

; if u  0
0; otherwise
and
Fu (u) =
8<:
(1 e  u ) (1 )

1 e  u1 

2 1 ; if u  0
0; otherwise
.
Unfortunately, analytical solution cannot be obtained in this case. The model
is solved numerically for  = 0:5 and three values of the utility interdependency
parameter : 0:6, 0:75, and 0:9.7
Figure 7 presents the cut-o values of the initial relationship quality q above which
the agents prefer to marry for each value of  and dierent values of the marriage
benet M : M = 0, M = 0:1, M = 0:5, M = 1, and M = 2. Figure 8 compares the
marriage rates for dierent values of  and M .
7The results are robust to changes in the parameter values. As previously mentioned, higher
values of  reduce the likelihood of adverse relationship utility shocks in the second period. With
higher values of  the divorce costs play a relatively smaller role in the paired agents' choice of
marriage versus cohabitation, since they are less likely to separate in either case.
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Figure 7: Heterogeneous agents and interdependent
utilities: Cut-o values of q
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Figure 8: Heterogeneous agents and interdependent
utilities: Marriage rate
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Notice that even for a large degree of utility interdependency ( = 0:6) the cut-o
value of q is decreasing and the marriage rate is increasing in the cost of divorce d
when M = 0. The U-shaped relationship between the marriage rate and the cost of
divorce is also present for small values of the marriage benet and becomes stronger
as the utilities become less interdependent (M = 0:1 and M = 0:5 on Figure 8).
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Marriage rates are higher when the utilities of paired agents are less interdependent,
since the value of eliminating the negative break-up externality is higher, inducing
couples with lower values of the initial relationship quality to marry.
Figure 9 shows that the net divorce rate is a decreasing function of the divorce cost
for any value of the exogenous marriage benet M . Figure 10 depicts the mean rela-
tionship welfare of agents for dierent values of M and  and the welfare-maximizing
cost of divorce. As before, the graph shows the welfare without the marriage benet,
so for any value of  the relationship welfare is lower for higher values of M since
couples with lower initial match quality choose marriage. The optimal divorce cost,
however, is chosen so as to maximize the total welfare, taking into account the mar-
riage benet M . Observe that for any  the highest relationship welfare is achieved
when M is small and d is large.
Figure 9: Heterogeneous agents and interdependent
utilities: Divorce rate
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Figure 10: Heterogeneous agents and interdependent
utilities: Average welfare
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The analysis in this section demonstrates that even a small degree of heterogene-
ity (low values of ) aects the decision to marry and alters the relationship between
the cost of divorce and marriage rates when the utility is non-transferable. Explain-
ing the empirical evidence on this relationship does not require the assumption of
heterogeneous agents with independent utilities; the assumption of some degree of
independency and utility non-transferability is sucient as long as the additional
benet to marriage is not too large.
6 Conclusion
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Appendix
Recall functions
v0 (t) = e
 t (2  t  e t)
and
v1 (t) = e
 t (t  3 + 2e t)
from equations (8) and (10), respectively.
Functions v0 (t) and v1 (t) are used in establishing the results in Proposition 3, so
it is useful to consider their properties. Figure 11 plots these functions.
Observe the following:
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Figure 11: Functions v0 (t) and v1 (t)
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 v0 (0) = 1; v0 (t0) = 0, v0 (t) > 0 for t < t0, and v0 (t) < 0 for t > t0, t0  1:8415.
As t ! 1, v0 (t)   0. Function v0 (t) has a unique minimum at t1, where t1
solves v00 (t) = v1 (t) = 0, and t1  2:8887, v0 (t1)   0:0526.
 v1 (0) =  1; v1 (t) < 0 for t < t1, and v1 (t) > 0 for t > t1. As t ! 1,
v1 (t)  +0.Function v1 (t) has a unique maximum at t2  3:9207, v1 (t2)  0:02.
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